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use#LAAABSTRACT An evaluative contrast between learned expertise and lay knowledge is a 
pervasive and longstanding feature of modern culture. Occasionally, the learned have 
pointed to  folkish proverbs to illustrate the inadequacies of common-sense reasoning 
and judgement. Proverbs are said perspicuously to display the superficiality, the 
imprecision, and even the logical contradictions of common-sense thinking. I offer an 
interpretation of proverbs in their naturally occurring settings as  epistemically 
powerful, mnemonically robust, practically pertinent, and referentially flexible. My 
purpose is not just to recuperate the value of proverbial reasoning but, ultimately, to 
show the relevance of such reasoning to a revised appreciation of modern technical 
practices, including science, technology and medicine. To  that end, the paper 
concludes with some speculative remarks about the linguistic forms in which the 
heuristics of present-day technical practices are expressed and transmitted. 
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Proverbial Economies: 
How an Understanding of Some Linguistic and 
Social Features of Common Sense Can Throw 
Light on More Prestigious Bodies of Knowledge, 
Science For Example 
Steven Shapzn 
Learned  expertise  describes  and  commends itself  as  it  describes  and 
condemns vulgar  knowledge.'  This  state  of  affairs  is  pervasive  at  the 
present time  and it belongs  to a long historical tradition. Scarcely  any 
canonical text of the Scientific Revolution, for example, failed to applaud 
proper  concepts and methods  by  way  of  a  flattering  contrast with  the 
uninstructed ways of the common people. The failings of vulgar knowledge 
were legion, but two defects were considered paramount among them: its 
tendency to remain trapped in the world of misleading superficial appear- 
ances and its unreflective tolerance of logical untidiness, of incoherence, or 
even  of  contradiction.  Superficiality,  and the  unreflectiveness  that gen- 
erated  it,  were  just  what  the  great  philosophical  modernizers  had  to 
overcome.  False belief was  a popular illness in pressing  need of  learned 
the rap^.^ 
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Sometimes the  learned  pointed  their  fingers  at  common  linguistic 
forms in which vulgar knowledge was cast and which revealed its superfici- 
ality and incoherence  in a particularly  clear  way.  Proverbs,  and similar 
folkish expressions, often served the turn. These were brief descriptive and 
prescriptive generalizations that the common people were known to value 
and routinely  employ. They evidently  spoke  about  how  things  were  in 
nature  ('Great oaks from little acorns grow'),  or in human affairs ('New 
brooms sweep clean'),  or they explicitly prescribed how prudent people 
ought  to behave  ('Look  before  you  leap').  Quite  commonly,  proverbs 
contained metaphors that folded prescriptive elements about human action 
into apparently descriptive generalizations  about nature  ('The early bird 
gets  the  worm'),  or  they  talked  about  human  nature  by  drawing  on 
metaphors from human-animal  interactions ('Lie down with dogs; rise up 
with  flea^').^  But to the learned eye a simple inspection of such sayings 
revealed their inferiority  to the propositions  and prescriptions of learned 
expertise.  So the  17th-century physician  and moralist Thomas Browne 
contrasted expert reason with vulgar irrationality. The people, he said, were 
'unable to wield the intellectual arms of reason',  so they tended 
to  betake  themselves unto  wasters  and the  blunter  weapons  of  truth; 
affecting the grosse and sensible waies of doctrine, and such as will not 
consist with strict and subtile reason. [So] unto them a piece of Rhetorick 
is  a sufficient argument  of  Logick,  an Apologue  of  Esope, beyond  a 
Syllogisme in  Barbara;  parables  then  propositions,  and proverbs  more 
powerfull  then  demonstrations.  And  therefore  they  are  led  rather  by 
example, then precept;  receiving perswasions from visible inducements, 
before intellectual1 instruction^.^ 
With some notable academic exceptions, this broad learned character- 
ization of proverbial common sense continues in currency. In the late 19th 
century the logician Alfred Sidgwick announced that 
Proverbs. . .are frequently employed in arguing by indistinct resemblance. 
It is the slackness with which any 'striking'  analogy will commonly pass 
muster that leads at all times to the use so freely made of proverbs. To 
assume that some case comes under some well-known proverb, without a 
shadow of evidence to show that it does so beyond what may be gathered 
from the crudest superficial inspection, is still in many quarters a favourite 
practice. 
Philosophers  tend to dislike proverbs  for the same reason  they tend to 
dislike metaphorical reasoning (and other forms of indexical expressions): 
both are undisciplined and both are supposed to embody imprecise and 
superficial modes of inference, leading to inexactitude and error.6  In social 
science, too, proverbs are occasionally used as a foil to expert knowledge: 
in modern textbooks folk generalizations about how people tend to behave 
are shown to be both shallow and incoherent,  needing repair by learned 
expertise, and the inadequacies of proverbial common sense are offered to 
students  as  major  inducements  to  take  social  science  seriously.'  The 
learned  recurrently  talk  about  proverbs  as  they  address  themselves  to 733  Shapin:Proverbial Economies 
common  sense  and its  standing vis-a-vis  formally  instructed  expertise, 
notably including philosophy and the sciences, both natural and social. For 
this  reason  alone,  proverbs  offer  a  pertinent  site  for  interpreting  the 
pervasive contrast between expertise and common sense, and for suggest- 
ing some new ways of thinking about that contrast. 
A few caveats, qualifications,  and explanations should be made at the 
outset: 
(1) All intellectual traditions generate their subversive elements, and there 
are  well-known  counter-instances  to  generalizations  about  learned 
contempt for ordinary reasoning and associated proverbial forms. In 
philosophy,  Montaigne,  Hurne,  James,  Dewey, Wittgenstein,  Rorty, 
and some practitioners  of  'ordinary  language philosophy'  have criti- 
cized their own discipline for defining its r61e as the repair of ordinary 
cognition and language-use;  in social science, the phenomenologists, 
the symbolic interactionists  and the ethnomethodologists have per- 
formed much the same function with respect to 'objectivist'  sociology; 
and in the natural sciences  there is,  as I  later  indicate,  a strand of 
thought that rejects the prevalent contrast between common sense and 
the methods of scientific expertise. For all that, there are scarcely any 
better sources than these internal criticisms  for documenting domi- 
nant  learned  tendencies  to  condemn  common  sense  and to  offer 
expert repair of common modes of reasoning and judging: that dom- 
inance is conceded and described even as it is criticized. 
(2) For a host of reasons, it will not do simply to equate proverbs with 
common sense.  For  one thing,  proverbs  are  linguistic  items,  often 
propositional, and not all everyday knowledge is linguistic or, insofar 
as it is  linguistic,  propositional.  Proverbs  can,  however,  be usefully 
treated as markers  of common sense,  not least because  the learned 
themselves  have traditionally used  them for that purpose,  and their 
usage is something one wants to inspect and interpret. Using proverbs 
as  a  counterpoint  to elements  of  learned expertise has the evident 
advantage of equitable comparison: insofar as the learned have treated 
their  knowledge  as  propositional,  it  is  apposite  to  offer  an  inter-
pretation of the propositional aspect of proverbs. 
(3) When scholars first began  collecting,  printing,  and commenting on 
proverbs -in the late Renaissance and early modern period -there was 
a great debate about whether such things were authentically folkish or 
whether they were of ancient learned origin, achieving wider distribu- 
tion as they descended the social scale. In the 16th and 17th centuries 
a general learned approval of proverbs was associated with a view that 
their genealogy did indeed trace back to learned authorship. The 18th 
century saw a polite and learned backlash against proverb-use  asso-
ciated  with  a  growing  tendency  to see  such  expressions  as  folkish 
through and through. For some time, the practical consensus among 
relevant linguists and folklorists has ascribed proverbs overwhelmingly 
to the common people.  Even  where  ancient  learned  usage  can be 734  Social Studies of Science 3115 
established, many scholars are now reluctant to take that as conclusive 
evidence  of learned authorship: Socrates,  Cicero and Juvenal  might 
well have been expressing learned sentiments in then-current folkish 
linguistic forms.8 
{4) So far as common sense itself is concerned, it is useful to retain the 
phrase as an importantly institutionalized marker - sorting, bounding 
and evaluating  what  are  taken  to be  different  sorts  of  knowledge, 
cognition, people and practices - while retaining the most open mind 
possible about common sense's coherence, identity, and standing with 
respect to supposedly different learned forms of  cognition and prac- 
tice.  I  follow  learned  characterizations  of  common  sense,  and  of 
proverbs  as one of its elements, in order to express scepticism about 
the sorting,  bounding  and evaluating  traditionally marked  by  those 
same characterizations.' 
I argue that many learned condemnations of proverbs are not merely 
wrong but interestingly  misdirected and misconceived. They tell us little 
about what proverbs are or about how proverbs work in naturally occurring 
settings, and they set up a contrast with learned knowledge that makes it 
hard  to  understand  what  that  knowledge  is  in  its  naturally  occurring 
settings. If we want to get learned knowledge right, that is, we can make a 
contribution by trying to get proverbial common sense right. Our culture 
has historically  tended  to  seize-up  with  anxiety  when  asked  to give  an 
account of the cognitive and linguistic processes of highly valued science, 
mathematics,  philosophy  and associated  learned practices. When we  are 
not using it merely as a foil to learned expertise, it is easier to engage with 
common sense in a relaxed and naturalistic frame of mind. I am primarily 
interested in giving an account of  scientific knowledge and related prac- 
tices, as are most readers of this journal. But if we take a detour by way of 
common sense and some of  its linguistic forms, when we  meet up with 
science again we  see it from an unaccustomed angle. I want here just  to 
show some paths that might be  taken  to achieve this changed  angle  of 
vision; I paint the resulting revised picture of scientific expertise only with 
the broadest of brushes. Nevertheless,  I have reason to think that taking 
this detour might be useful and interesting to students of science and other 
expert practices. 
The first substantive section of the paper briefly characterizes proverbs 
while pointing out problems associated with any attempt to give them an 
exact  and  coherent  definition. This  section  goes  on to  consider  some 
structural features of proverbs that help us to appreciate their grip on the 
mind, their  ability to circulate undeformed,  and the real  epistemic and 
moral value some people have seen in them. I note how a proper apprecia- 
tion of  proverbs'  often metaphorical  character allows one to understand 
their semantic and referential scope, while showing that translation from 
proverbs'  metaphorical  base  to  situations-at-hand  is  unnecessary. The 
second section argues the importance of considering proverbs as features 
in naturally occurring scenes of action, spoken by certain kinds of people, 735  Shapzn: Proverbial Economies 
with a view to judging  and acting properly in those  specific scenes,  and 
against  the  backdrop  of  all  the knowledge  participants  bring  to those 
scenes. I call such scenes proverbial economies, and I show the insufficiency 
of  treating  proverbs  solely  in  their  propositional  aspect.  A  proverbial 
economy,  in my usage,  is a network of  speech, judgement  and action in 
which  proverbial  utterances  are  considered  legitimate  and valuable,  in 
which  judgement  is  shaped,  and action prompted,  by  proverbs  compe- 
tently  uttered  in pertinent  ways  and settings:  that is  to say,  a  cultural 
system in which proverbial speech has the capacity of making a difference 
to judgement and action. In section 3, I comment on the unfoundedness of 
viewing proverbial  common sense as unreflective:  if  you wanted to treat 
proverbs  solely in their guise as propositions-about-the-world,  you could 
retrieve a host of such propositions that make serious trouble for learned 
criticisms  of  common sense as trapped in the superficial world  of  mere 
appearance. The fourth section mobilizes evidence that much proverbial 
common  sense  is  not  only  reflective  but  even  'fashionably'  relativistic 
about  knowledge-claims,  social  conventions  and  cultural  authority.  In 
section 5, I dispute a traditional learned condemnation of proverbs as self- 
contradictory  and,  for  that  reason,  worthless.  Again,  I  argue  that  this 
charge enjoys local plausibility only by virtue of misconceiving the object of 
attack - as a body of proverbial propositions rather than a scene of speech 
and action. Finally, I re-visit the contrast between learned knowledge and 
proverbial common sense. In very general terms, what does this contrast 
look like at the end of  the exercise? What possibilities for understanding 
science and other formal bodies of learned knowledge are opened up or 
assisted once we have taken a sideways look at some linguistic and social 
features of common-sense-in-action? I draw attention here to the heuristics 
of  modern expert practices,  often  embodied  as  maxims  and 'technical 
proverbs',  that are significantly involved in the making,  transmission and 
justification of expert bodies of knowledge. 
1.What are Proverbs and How Do They Work? 
From the earliest  learned engagement with proverbs  to the inquiries  of 
present-day academic folklorists, socio-linguists and anthropologists, there 
has never been notable agreement about how to define proverbs and how 
to distinguish them from other,  formally related,  short linguistic  genres. 
Some individual scholars seemed (and seem) confident in their ability to 
define  and distinguish a range  of  such items - adages,  aphorisms,  apo- 
phthegms,  cliches,  commonplaces,  dicta,  epigrams,  exempla,  gnomes, 
maxims, precepts, saws, sayings, sententiae and tags - but no definitional 
scheme seems ever to have escaped learned critici~m.'~  Archer Taylor, the 
premier 20th-century scholar in the area (in terms of art, a parcemiologist), 
despaired  of  any  structural definition  and fell  back  on competent  tacit 
knowledge: 
The definition of a proverb is too difficult to repay the undertaking; and 
should  we  fortunately  combine  in  a  single definition  all  the  essential 736  Social Studies of Science 3115 
elements and give  each the proper emphasis, we  should not even  then 
have  a touchstone. An  incommunicable quality tells us this sentence is 
proverbial and  that  one  is  not. Hence no definition will  enable us  to 
identify positively a sentence as proverbial. Those who  do not  speak a 
language can never recognize all its proverbs. .  .I1 
Moreover, as I will later show, definitions which seek to pin down proverbs 
by their structural linguistic characteristics give the game away, achieving 
clarity at the price of pertinence. 
Proverbs are not fixed natural kinds:  different sorts of people define 
them differently, depending on their purposes and points of  view.  One 
might as well say that proverbs  are what these different people have said 
they are and, for the modern learned, that proverbs  are what you find in 
proverb dictionaries. There are, however, some widely quoted definitions 
which, in their family resemblances,  capture much of what is relevant in 
present connections. It is relatively uncontroversial to say that proverbs are 
short sentences,  and their  brevity  is  one traditional  way  folklorists  and 
linguists  have  of  distinguishing them  from  such more  expansive  'short 
genres'  as the aphorism  and the apophthegm. But how  short is  short? 
Probably 'Short enough to remember and for a lot of people to use in a 
linguistically stable form'. As it happens,  few proverbs found in standard 
compilations are longer than 10 or 12 words. But brevity is not considered 
enough to make a proverb,  and many commentators conjoin brevity and 
some notion of pithiness - pointing to the ability of a genuine proverb to 
distil experience, to say something worthwhile and important in an unu- 
sually economical way and, moreover, in a manner that marks it off from 
the flow of ordinary speech. So the Restoration collector Thomas Fuller 
famously  said  that  proverbs  were  'much  matter  decocted  into  few 
words'. l2 
Other  criteria  specified  that  proverbs,  properly  so  called,  have  a 
homespun, metaphorical character - indeed, Aristotle defined proverbs as 
'metaphors from one species to another'."  They are supposed to be a kind 
of referential poetics,  often explicitly compared in that way to the precise 
and literal propositions of learned speech and writing. Proverbs are said to 
draw upon familiar, everyday experience - for example,  about how birds 
and dogs behave - but they make  their  meaning through metaphorical 
extension to human situations and to other natural situations of interest to 
human beings. And,  while many locutions found in proverb compilations 
are indeed figurative in this way,  others are not, speaking about what's in 
the nature of priests and cooks, women and men, the young and the old, 
just  as they are.14 Some attempts to characterize proverbs,  and to mark 
them  off  from  aphorisms,  insisted  upon  their  antiquity:  the  origins  of 
proverbs  were  either  lost  in the mists  of  time  or they  descended from 
respected ancient authors, but, in any case, they were not supposed to be 
the kind  of thing that you  could now just  make up on the spot,  claim 
authorship of, and put into general circulation. There is nothing new in the 
notion that, as it were, 'the age of proverb-making  is past'." 737  Shapin: Proverbial Economies 
In  an overwhelmingly  oral  culture - such  as  that  of  16th-century 
England where scholarly proverb-collecting became an important activity -
proverb-like  sayings were intensively used,  by  both the learned and the 
common people. Their form and pithiness gave them great mnemonic and 
rhetorical  force  and, when properly used,  they secured  easy recognition 
and, often,  assent. Their value flowed partly fiom the primacy of orality 
and the way  that proverb-citing  could give the written  text some of  the 
authority that then powerfully resided  in the oral and the face-to-face. 
Scholars'  and gentlemen's  commonplace books were chock-full of them, 
sometimes arranged under appropriate 'heads'  or topics,  testifying to the 
value placed upon them and ensuring their easy retrieval for occasions of 
argument, pleading,  instructing or entertaining.  Some modern scholars 
trace  changing  learned  evaluations  of  proverbs  to the increasing  dom- 
inance of literate over oral modes of  communication, as  well  as  to the 
declining  plausibility  of  assigning  proverbs  to  specific  ancient  learned 
authorship.16 
Suppose one accepts that proverbs do belong to 'the people' and that a 
search for their authorship - learned or otherwise - is generally bound to 
fail. What would this mean for proverbs'  identity and authority? In this 
view - which is the modern learned consensus, and which may well have 
been dominant among the common people themselves - proverbs express 
the condensed experience of nameless hosts of knowing ancestors. Barbara 
Herrnstein Smith nicely characterizes the proverb as a 'saying' rather than 
a 'said'  or a 'says':  it is 'speech without a speaker, a self-sufficient verbal 
object rather than a verbal act,  an utterance that asserts itself independ- 
ently of any utterer - continuously,  as it were, or indeed eternally'.17 The 
'they'  in the 'they say'  commonly prefacing proverb-utterances  is generic 
ancestral wisdom, not a set of nameable authors. That is one reason why a 
proverbial  economy  should  be  pertinent  material  for  anyone  taking  a 
sociological,  or indeed  a  historical,  view  of  how  knowledge  comes to 
acquire  authority.  So one commentator perceptively  speculates that the 
denigration of proverbs is testimony to the epistemological individualism of 
the modern learned classes: 
Perhaps  there  is  now  something  unacceptable  in  the  very  notion  of 
collective wisdom: more to the modern individualist taste is Wilde's quip 
that 'a truth ceases to be true when more than one person believes it'." 
Whatever  is  thought  of  the virtues  and vices  of  vulgar  knowledge  has 
tended to be thought  of  proverbs  as  well.  If  you  don't  think much  of 
prudence,  practical  reasoning,  rules  of  thumb,  tradition,  and  situated 
knowledge, you probably won't  think much of proverbs either.I9 
From the Restoration  through the  19th century a list of  'six  things 
required to a proverb'  was pervasively cited: the first five items on the list 
are unexceptional - a proverb should be short, plain,  common, figurative 
and ancient - but the sixth comes as something of a shock against  the 
general run of learned opinion: the proverb is said to be 'true'.20 What 738  Social Studies of  Science 3115 
evidence  could  there be to support such an apparently perverse claim? 
And, in general,  how might one go about appreciating the considerable 
authority and grip of proverbial expressions? 
First, consider the means by which proverbs arrest attention and grip 
the mind. A range of linguistic characteristics has the effect of setting the 
proverb off from the normal run of speech or even of writing. Proverbial 
expressions,  as Erving GofIinan might have  said,  'break  frame'."  Meta-
phor is one way in which proverbial out-of-the-ordinariness is secured, a 
striking figure allowing the proverb to break free of the supposed literalness 
of  ordinary discourse. In this sense, metaphorical proverbs  mark what is 
being said as special in the same way that poetry does: the juxtaposition  of 
the homespun and familiar with novel situations, the special extension of 
meaning between the one and the other, and the sense that language has 
'gone on holiday'  invite special notice. 
Still other structural linguistic  characteristics work  to secure for the 
proverb what I call mnemonic robustness - the capacity  of the proverb to 
seize  the  mind,  to be  easily  remembered  and  retrieved,  and  to  resist 
deformation as  it  circulates  in the  culture and over time. Aids  to this 
mnemonic  robustness  include  rhyme  ('A  stitch  in  time  saves  nine'), 
alliteration ('Many men, many minds'), semantic symmetry, parallelism, or 
inversion  ('Better  a lean peace  than a fat war'),  surprising contrasts  ('A 
shlimazl  falls  on his  back  and  hurts  his  nose'),  and  so  on.  Indeed, 
robustness is perhaps too weak a term for talking about how proverbs resist 
deformation. It is very important to say a proverb just right. If you say 'You 
can conduct a donkey to the pasture, but you cannot make him consume 
grass',  or even  'A  new  broom  cleans  efficiently',  you  will  probably  be 
corrected by  those  who  know  the proper  form,  and the persuasive  or 
communicative  effect  sought for will  be  lost,  even though  the message 
conveyed by  your  mistaken  form is,  from  a  certain point  of  view,  'the 
same'. While there are well-established variant forms of particular proverbs 
-some people say 'Stolen fruit is sweet' while others say 'Stolen apples are 
sweetest' - you are supposed to use an established form just  as it is - no 
paraphrase  will  do - and in this  respect  proverbs  are a  form of  ritual 
utterance. The linguist Thomas Sebeok, writing of the 'charm'  (or magical 
incantation)  of  a  Uralic  traditional  culture,  notes  that  its  effectiveness 
'depends on its literally exact  citation, and,  conversely,. .. any departure 
from its precisely  set mechanism  may  render the magic wholly ineffec- 
ti~e'.~~ And,  of  course,  the  same  may  be  said  of  religious  professions, 
blessings and the formulaic incantations of childhood cultures studied by 
the Opies.23  Although proverbs  are uttered in,  and take their sense from, 
specific  occasions,  linguistically they  stand  apart  from,  and above,  the 
specificities  of  those  occasions.  Their  stability,  the  ethnomethodologist 
Harvey Sacks noted, 'can be something independent from any occasion of 
use'.  Modifying proverbs  at will,  like summarizing or paraphrasing  their 
message, would result in something which at once lacked the authority and 
the 'frame-breaking'  character of the proper form: it's  not done.24  Those 739  Shapin: Proverbial Economies 
who accept Bruno Latour's association of power with that which is immu- 
table and mobile should be interested in how proverbs resist deformation 
while tra~elling.'~ 
Consider also the reference of proverbs and what it is that they counsel 
with respect to their objects of reference. Proverbs are orientated towards 
experience. They report on accumulated experience, human and natural; 
they make those reports efficiently available to people who mean to act in 
the world; they recommend courses of action in light of  experience;  and 
therefore - jarring as it may seem to say so - proverbs represent a widely 
distributed form of  expertise. The 'expert'  is,  after all,  someone who has 
relevant experience, and expertise is that embodied experience. That is to 
say,  proverbs  have both a representational  and a pragmatic  component. 
They  are  about  the  world,  but  not  about  it  mainly  as  an  object  of 
c~ntemplation.'~ Sometimes they comment upon action taken, drawing or 
inviting conclusions so that future actions should be better informed, as if 
to say 'Well, what can you expect?', or 'That's what those sort of people will 
do', 'That's  the way these things turn out'. 'You play with matches, you get 
burned';  'The squeaky wheel gets the grease';  'You can't take trouts with 
dry bree~hes'.'~ 
Kenneth Burke thought that if you correctly understood how proverbs 
work  you  could  arrive  at a  better  appreciation  of  literature  in general. 
Proverbs were a kind of 'medicine'  or therapy:  it's  just  a lot easier to say 
that kind of thing about proverbs  than about King Lear. Why not, Burke 
asked, 
extend the analysis of proverbs to encompass the whole field of literature? 
Could the most  complex and sophisticated  works  of  art be considered 
somewhat as 'proverbs writ large'? 
Proverbs, Burke recognized,  are indeed about experience (in both natural 
and human domains) but what they do is to name experiential '"type" 
situations', and often to counsel how one is to act in these type situations. 
One orientates to activity as one sees what kind of situation one is in. So 
proverbs 
are strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as situations are typical 
and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them 
and strategies for handling them." 
Or, as Sacks put it, proverbs are used 'to make events noticeable, perhaps 
to make their ordered character n~ticeable'.'~ 
The matter  can be  put more  strongly  than  that.  Since  'the  same' 
situation is potentially construable (noticeable) in different ways, proverbs 
are resources  for  creating scenes  of  observation  and action,  for making 
situations  recognizable  as  situations  of  a  certain  kind.  Confronted,  for 
example, by discussions about military tactics,  is the gist of the situation 
summed up, and its proper purpose identified, by a proverbial pronounce- 
ment on the risks of ambition and the misplaced search for certainty -'The 740  Social Studies of  Science  3115 
best-laid schemes of mice and men gang aft agley' -or by one stressing the 
importance of detail -'Look high and fall low'? Each proverb can count as 
a pertinent way of identifying 'what  is going on here',  of picking out and 
directing notice to its salient features. And,  as each names and configures 
the situation differently, so each offers resources for acting in it differently, 
thus making it the situation proverbially named. This is how proverbs help 
to constitute their  referential  realities. The metaphorical  component  of 
many  proverbs  also  provides  resources  for  creating  situations  through 
naming them. When we  address  some passage  of  human behaviour by 
saying 'Birds of a feather flock together',  we can make available whatever is 
known about birds for understanding and orientating to kinds of human 
beings.30 But what  it  is  specifically about birds  that is  relevant  to  the 
human case at hand is not exactly defined. In Aristotelian terms, proverbs 
belong to the process known as deliberation - the taking of decisions about 
what to do, what may be brought about by our own efforts, in the realm of 
the more or less and of the contingent -where absolute certainty is neither 
available  nor  rationally  to  be  expected.  They belong  to  the  complex 
circumstances of life-as-it-is-lived,  not to the idealizations of philosophy or 
science.31  Or, in Stephen Toulmin's vocabulary, proverbs are aids to action 
not in the domain of Reason but of reas~nableness.~~ 
What is  the experience about which proverbs  speak? Like  scientific 
theories and laws, proverbs are generalizations.33  This bears upon - indeed 
it is another way of pointing out - proverbs'  often figurative content. The 
'cock'  in  'Every  cock crows  on his  own  dunghill'  is  both  a generalized 
rooster and a generalized human being, while the 'every' - as opposed to 
'some'  or 'many' - marks the fact that a generalization  of  wide scope is 
being offered. The 'dirt'  referred to when we say 'Throw dirt enough and 
some will stick', similarly can be a fabricated story of sexual misconduct or 
a concocted accusation of scholarly dishonesty, but it is rarely garden soil, 
even if the properties of soil may have some relevance to the reference at 
hand. This is  just  a  way  of pointing  out proverbs'  enormous  semantic 
reach.  Proverbs evidently  speaking  about what's  in the nature  of  birds, 
brides  and brooms may  nevertheless find use  in an unpredictably  wide 
range of domains or situations. And as they find those applications, so the 
proverbs'  reference subtly changes. Put another way,  philosophical suspi- 
cion  of  proverbs  is  wholly  justified:  they  are  a  logical  empiricist's 
nightmare. 
None  the  less,  too  much  should  not be  made  of  the  move  from 
proverbs' metaphorical base to the particularities of the situations in which 
they find application. You  do not have to know very much,  if  anything, 
about the ways of chickens or the adhesive properties of garden soil to use 
the relevant proverbs properly and pertinently. It was only a few years ago 
that I understood why one might want to look a horse in the mouth: I'd 
never done it myself, and where I grew up - not exactly horsey country -
no one else did either. However, I insist, for many years before that, I was 
able to understand, and properly use, the proverb 'Don't  look a gift horse 
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occasions of competent usage, and I understood - as part of competently 
knowing what was happening in these scenes of competent usage - what 
intention  was  expressed  in the saying.  Reiterated  usage  builds  up  the 
reference, and, while translation from the farmyard domain may occur for 
some users,  on some occasions,  such translation is not at all necessary.34 
That is presumably why we  still properly say - and find sense in - such 
proverbs as 'The exception proves the rule',  'You can't make bricks without 
straw',  and 'Strike while the iron is hot',  even though many of those who 
competently say  and hear such things have no experience with the tech- 
niques  of  brick-making  and blacksmithing,  and have  never  known  the 
historical sense of  'proving'  as 'trying'  or 'testing'  which puts the  17th- 
century meaning at  180 degrees  from its present-day  sense.35 If  enough 
situational  context  is  available,  and enough  experience with  competent 
usage is on tap,  you don't have to translate from metaphorical proverbs' 
literal  aspect  reliably to grasp  their  meaning here and now.36 A  theory 
about how proverbs  originated, and how they circulated and signified in 
their original settings, is not necessarily adequate to account for how they 
circulate and signify in other contexts. Even while resisting deformation in 
their utterance, proverbs escape any such semantic discipline. And that is a 
mark of their referential power. 
Of course, some currently used metaphorical proverbs  may continue 
to draw upon familiar experience. Most of the educated classes probably 
still know just enough about lubricating mechanical gadgets to understand 
literally why 'The squeaky wheel gets the grease',  and you don't have to be 
an ornithologist to know that many birds of the same species just  do tend 
to hang out with each other. In such cases, it can make some sense to talk 
about an external mode of generalizing experience: in order to understand 
metaphorical  proverbs  we  are  supposed  to  move  outwards  from  their 
manifest  content  (for  instance,  wheels  and birds)  to their  situationally 
intended reference (complaining academic colleagues and clannish mem- 
bers  of the '-ology'  down the corridor). But metaphorical  proverbs  also 
importantly display an internal generalizing disposition. Take the proverb 
'A rolling stone gathers no moss',  and take for granted that its situational 
reference is usually competently understood not to be rocks but instances 
of human beha~iour.'~  Perhaps knowledge of stones is  involved in com- 
petent proverb-use:  for some people on some occasions it might well be. 
But what one has to understand here is not something to do with features 
of that little-oval-gray-stone-with-pyrite-specwe- 
desert-last-week.  The stone  of  proverbial  reference  is  not  a historically 
specific stone,  just  as  its rolling  behaviour  is  not  a historically  specific 
event. Anyone who presumed otherwise would be judged incompetent, at 
least pedantic, possibly even mad, and that is why proverbs are sometimes 
used in clinical tests of mental illness.''  Rather, insofar as mineral concre- 
tions are involved in the reference  of this proverb,  what's  talked  about is 
stones and what it is in their nature to do, and about what tends to happen 
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In Aristotelian terms,  what  happens to the proverbial  stone is  that 
which  happens  in  a  certain  way  'for  the  most  part',  and,  therefore, 
proverbial references to stones, or to pertinently similar aspects of human 
behaviour, are to be treated as true 'for the most part'. There are all sorts of 
complexities  and contingencies involved in real-life  situations (natural or 
human); and it is only in the mostly irrelevant ideal-world that the essential 
nature  of  things  is  invariably  and precisely  expressed. The competent 
proverb-user appreciates that there may be stones in the world that roll and 
gather some moss; stones that do not roll and nevertheless gather little or 
no moss; and, indeed, people who are constantly on the go and yet who are 
boringly  habit-bound.  Instances  may  be  found that  contradict the pro- 
verb's  experiential generalization, without compromising its truth. This is 
how generalizing proverbial  statements of wide validity ('Every  cock will 
crow on his own dunghill')  or non-metaphorical proverbs ('Like father like 
son')  can co-exist, without contradiction or damage to their validity, with 
knowledge of specific counter-instances to the generalization. Indeed, the 
physical fact that it is almost never 'darkest just before dawn' detracts in no 
way  from  the validity  of  its  proverbial  application,  as  the proverb,  for 
example,  captures  something of  the psychological  trajectory  of  human 
despair.40 Here is  yet  another way  in  which  proverbs  are  epistemically 
powerful things. 
Given that the generalizations expressed in proverbs  are true 'for the 
most part',  or 'in the sense in which they are competently intended',  it is 
not pertinent -it is, indeed, a violation of decorum -to treat proverbially- 
expressed generalizations  either  as  invitations  to systematic  inquiry  (as 
prolegomena to empirical study of metamorphic stones and their environ- 
mental  accretions)  or as vulnerable to empirically  observed counter-in- 
stances.41  Harvey Sacks noted academics' general tendency to treat pro- 
verbs solely as propositions about their explicit referents,  'and to suppose 
then that it goes without saying that the corpus of proverbs is subjectable to 
the same  kind  of  treatment  as,  for  example,  is  scientific kn~wledge'.~~ 
Bruno Latour specifically contrasts the referential 'softness'  of proverbs to 
the 'hardness'  of scientific propositions. As an example of the distinction, 
he offers a mother telling her son 'An apple a day keeps the doctor away'. 
The awkward  son replies  by  citing scientific  studies that contradict the 
empirical validity of the proverbial generalization. What impresses Latour 
about the exchange is that the proverb's  claims to truth cannot stand the 
test of the resources the son brings to bear on it: the son's 'hard' language- 
game mobilizes  resources  that  the mother's  'soft'  one can't  cope  with. 
Latour observes that the proverb is not used, as scientific propositions are, 
as an argument to win a counter-argument and that it does not have the 
strength to do so. That's  right, of course, but the power of the mother's 
proverbial utterances is linked to the fact that she will, in this case, accept 
no  counter-argument  from  nutritional  research.  The  son  doesn't  win 
because of the 'hardness'  of his scientific speech; he just winds up looking 
silly or insolent. The upshot of any such exchange is not the triumph of 
scientific over proverbial propositions;  it is a failure in the son's  sense of 743  Shapin: Proverbial Economies 
decorum, as the mother herself would fail were she to interject that proverb 
into a formal exchange between expert  nutritionist^.^^ 
Sacks observed that 'one  of the facts about proverbs is that they are 
"correct  about something"',  and Aristotle rather irritably wrote that 'just 
because they are commonplace,  everyone seems to agree with them,  and 
therefore they are taken for  That reputation is  a real epistemic 
advantage,  and  one  index  of  this  advantage  is  the  manner  in  which 
proverbs are often used. They are recurrently employed as a kind of coda -
a way  of summing-up or bringing matters to a head or conclusion, often 
performing a function similar to Dr Johnson's  'And  that's  an end of the 
matter'.  The Economist's  celebrated house-style  continues to use proverbs 
abundantly to the same  effect - summing-up a line of  description  and 
evaluation and occasionally at the same time deflating the balloons of fancy 
economic or management the~rizing.~~  Unless the setting is the extended 
proverb-exchange  common in traditional societies, proverbs are not invita- 
tions  to continued  conversation on the topic  at hand;  they  are,  rather, 
conversation-stoppers,  signalling that perhaps it's  time to move on from 
this particular subject, that this is, for the moment at least, the last word on 
the matter. 
2. Proverbial Economies 
Many proverbial  sentences  can be thought  of  as  rule-like  propositions, 
used to regulate judgement and counsel action in a range of situations. So 
it is pertinent to compare them with other rule-like propositions we know 
about and how these other propositions work. There is  a sense in which 
proverbs  are truer than those propositional rules which function in econ- 
omies that do invite inquiry as to their validity. Harvey Sacks offered as a 
comparison the law and its rules: 
[There] if  you invoke a rule by reference to precedent, the occasion of 
using it can provide the occasion for reconsidering the rule to see whether, 
not only in this instance but in general, it ought to obtain for anything. So 
that a rule introduced to govern a situation in a law case can be changed 
altogether. 
And so Sacks saw no reason to resist the apparently odd conclusion that 
'even a strict precedence system such as [the law] doesn't have objects as 
powerful  and as limitedly  attackable as  proverb^'.^^  Part of the sensible 
oddness here consists in the observation that a weak Popperian object - a 
proposition  which resists falsification and which therefore is widely sup- 
posed to have no epistemic virtue - is among the most useful and robust 
elements of our cu1tu1-e.~~  What is supposedly lost in refutability is gained 
in adaptability. 
Whether  metaphorical  or  not,  proverbs  are  generalizations  which 
nevertheless take their meaning as they are invoked in particular situations 
of judgement and action. The  proverb thus appears in two guises -first, the 
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and  circulated  as  linguistically  stable;  and,  second,  its  highly  variable 
semantics and reference,  deriving from the multiplicities  of situations to 
which it is applied and which determine its meanings. Proverbs link the 
general and the particular. They make this instance of judgement  or action 
understandable or legitimate, in light of statements about what it is in the 
nature of things to do, or of people to behave, or of situations to turn out. 
And,  as they get applied to further particular occasions, so the references 
of the generalizations are themselves modified. 
The proverb 'Everyone  knows where his shoe pinches'  can be perti- 
nently brought to bear on lay or expert medical diagnosis,  to methodo- 
logical debates in Anglo-American  sociology, to the marketing and design 
of  personal  computers,  to the  distribution  of  charitable  funds,  and to 
innumerable other situations now  existing or to unpredictable  situations 
which will come into existence in the future. Such specific situations, as 
Kenneth  Burke  observed,  'are  all  distinct  in  their  particularities;  each 
occurs  in  a  totally  different  texture  of  history;  yet  all  are  classifiable 
together under the generalizing head of the same proverb'.48 The purpose 
of using this proverb is to draw attention to an accepted and widely known 
general rule which is illustrated by the case at hand, or, conversely, how the 
case at hand comes under the compass of some accredited and familiar 
generali~ation.~~ 
These observations suggested to Sacks a way  of  understanding pro- 
verbial economies as 'atopical'  phenomena. The point of the rolling stone 
that gathers no moss is atopical in that nothing pertinent to its sense and 
use is to be illuminated by reference to particular mineralogical or botani- 
cal findings. It is not a matter here of  concrete versus abstract modes of 
thinkmg,  as if failure to comprehend the proverb's  moral message were a 
failure of the ability to abstract. The proverb-as-proposition  is quite ab- 
stract  just  as  it  is,  since  it  is  not  competently  to  be  understood  as 
concerning the behaviour of any particular stone. I have already indicated 
that in vernacular usage proverbs are not competently subject to empirical 
inquiry about their validity, nor are they as a body monitored for logical 
consistency  or non-contradiction.  On the contrary,  while  they  may  be 
misapplied - and thus lack in force -proverbs are held to be true, and it is 
the work of the auditors in a scene to figure out how they are true here and 
now, how they pertinently address judgement and action in this particular 
setting. This is a very powerful way of organizing bodies of knowledge and 
action. 'In that way',  Sacks noticed, 'instead of constantly revising a body 
of knowledge by reference to the discovery that it's  not correct here, now, 
for this, you maintain a stable body of knowledge and control the domain 
of its use'.50 
It has,  indeed,  been  a notable feature  of  learned  engagement  with 
proverbs to compile them, to make a list of them, to inspect them as a body 
for coherence and sense, and I shall return to that tendency towards the 
end of this paper. But the acts of compilation, arrangement and inspection 
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things as the vernacular  items purportedly compiled. A proverbial econ- 
omy does not compile its body of  short-generic propositions  or prescrip- 
tions and inspect them in these ways or make their generalizations occa- 
sions for inquiry. Were it to do so, then it would be some other lund of 
epistemic economy. In a proverbial economy the pertinent judgement does 
not concern the truth of the proverb -that is largely taken for granted -but 
the pertinence and productiveness of inserting this particular proposition 
into this scene.51 
Against  the  general  learned  tendency  to  treat  proverbs  as  naked 
propositions-on-a-printed-page,  there are some anthropological and socio- 
linguistic recommendations to conceive them as speeches in situations of 
use,  that is,  to get to grips with functioning proverbial economies.52 As 
early as 1926, the anthropologist Raymond Firth insisted that 
The meaning of a proverb is made clear only when side by side with the 
translation  is given a full account of the accompanying social situation -
the reason for its use,  its effect, and its significance in speech. It is  by 
nature not a literary product.53 
Anthropologists  recognized  that  the  meanings  of  proverbs  were  rarely 
transparent to na'ive or non-native auditors just  as they were.54  They may 
have to be explicated, de-coded, seen to be correctly chosen, spoken, and 
applied. Who does that? Who can do that? 
Aristotle's Rhetoric sounded a significant warning to people about to 
spout these sorts of sayings: 
The use of maxims is appropriate only to elderly men,  and in handling 
subjects in  which the speaker is  experienced.  For  a young  man to use 
them is -like telling stories -unbecoming; to use them in handling things 
in  which  one has no experience  is  silly and ill-bred:  a fact sufficiently 
proved by the special fondness of country fellows for coining maxims, and 
their readiness to air them.55 
As  general counsels about how to judge  and what to do, they just  don't 
work when uttered by the kinds of people who are competently known not 
to have broad experience and not to have the authority to pronounce about 
what  should be done. In a society that acknowledges the epistemic and 
moral virtues of embodied age-and-experience, you don't ask your grand- 
mother about her warrants for attaching a proverbial generalization to a 
particular event -for the very same reason that you don't teach her to 'suck 
eggs', 'get children',  'sup sour milk',  or 'grope her ducks' - just because it 
is her embodied authority that provides adequate grounds for such attach- 
ments. And, again, your grandmother's  proverbial assertions are not occa- 
sions  for  inquiry  into  their  evidential  warrant,  just  because  it  is  her 
embodied authority that tells you what adequate evidence is. 
Similarly, an African ethnographer observes how proverbs can work to 
reassure or to reconcile: 
This is  also the function of  proverbs in modern Occidental culture, or 
rather  of  the  'bromides'  with  which  they  have  been  merged.. . . [A] 746  Social Studies of Science 3115 
proverb is usually quoted to the disturbed individual by a senior, and it 
comes as the voice of  the ancestors, his seniors par e~cellence.~~ 
Note the pervasive 'My  son'  prefacing the Biblical Proverbs - 'My  son, 
keep my words';  'My son, forget not my law' - and the presumption that 
proverbs  are both repositories  of value,  that their  wisdom  may  not be 
transparent to the young and naive, and that they may require explication 
by the old and experienced. The young or na'ive person is apt to choose 
proverbs  badly  or to misapply  them,  thus rendering them worthless.  So 
said  the Apocryphal  book  Ecclesiasticus:  'A  proverb will  fall flat when 
uttered by  a fool, for he will produce it at the wrong time'.57 This was 
Sancho Panza's  problem: his proverbs  came out all in a jumble,  without 
due recognition of their proper occasions of use. 'Look you, Sancho',  Don 
Quixote said, 'I  do not find fault with a proverb aptly introduced, but to 
load and string on proverbs  higgledy-piggledy makes your speech mean 
and ~ulgar'.~'While  many proverbs are indeed propositions, the knowledge 
of how to store, select, and apply proverbs - and therefore of how to give 
them force - is itself not propositional: it is a skill acquired by experience 
and,  when  acquired  and  displayed,  a  mark  of  wisdom. There  are  no 
propositions that adequately specify the conditions of proper usage. This 
sense of  decorum is  substantially given by age-and-experience,  and it is 
made manifest to others - and hence potentially transmissible - by the 
example of embodied wisdom. Absent such examples, proverbs  in them- 
selves  can have  little  authority.  For  this  reason,  a  proverbial  economy 
cannot be described without figuring in the culture surrounding embodied 
proverb-speakers  as well as the occasions of proverb-use. 
A similar  consideration  applies  to the metaphorical aspect of many 
proverbs. If the pertinence of a metaphor cannot be subject to proof, how 
is it made locally persuasive? In this connection, too, a particular speaker in 
a particular setting has got to point out, if necessary iteratively, just what it 
is about, for example, rolling stones and moss in general that competently 
applies to this aspect of human behaviour at hand. This 'matching up'  or 
'correlation'  can draw on any and all aspects of the present scene, but one 
very potent  scenic  element is,  once more,  the embodied attributes and 
authority of the one who speaks, who invokes the proverb,  and who adds 
his or her personal and generic authority to those of the nameless ancestors 
for whom he or she now  speaks.59  One cannot properly talk about how 
proverbs  are true  and pertinent  without  talking  about  the  capacity  of 
certain kinds  of people in certain kinds  of  scenes to identify what is to 
count as truth and pertinence. Just as Aristotle said that you should not 
utter  proverbs  until  you  reached  a  certain  age,  so  he  recognized  the 
'character'  of a speaker as 'almost the most effective means of persuasion 
he posse~ses'.~~ 
3. Proverbs as Reflective Knowledge 
From traditional learned points of view,  talking about proverbs - items of 
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must seem odd. It suggests a kind of reflectiveness usually associated only 
with the deliberations and pronouncements  of the learned. Indeed, this 
paper  set  out  by  gesturing  at  a  great  tradition  in  which  the  learned 
commended themselves  and  condemned  proverbs  by  noting  that  pro- 
verbial common sense was endemically unreflective. The common people, 
it is said,  take things just  as they seem to be,  habitually declining to go 
behind  superficial  appearance to the truth or pattern  that lies behind. 
However, as stable as this imputation has been over the centuries, there is 
a sense in which it is flatly contradicted by the most cursory inspection of 
any proverb dictionary. Thousands of proverbs, in all cultures, enjoin just 
the sort of reflectiveness that is  supposedly absent  from common-sense 
knowledge. They counsel the inexperienced and the na'ive against vulgar 
errors  of  inadequately  justified  judgement  or  undisciplined  inference. 
(Even  the vulgar  have their vulgarians.)  Actors in proverbial  economies 
have  available to  them  a  stream  of  advice  that counsels  against taking 
things just as they seem to be. Experience advises otherwise: 'Every light is 
not the sun';  'Everyone thinks his own fart smells sweet'.61 
Proverbs of this sort can be called inference instructors, and they come in 
several varieties.  One type of proverbial instruction cautions against pre- 
mature or over-enthusiastic inference from particular to pattern. It warns 
those with a restricted  stock of experience that it is unwise to infer fi-om 
one instance, fi-om short-term patterns, or from local manifestations, to the 
way things will normally pan out, to the course of nature or the nature of 
people.  Such  inference-instructing  proverbs,  when  suitably  uttered  by 
suitable people,  identify the pitfalls  to sound judgement  that have been 
noticed by  long experience. Indeed,  they tell  inexperienced people that 
they are inexperienced, and in what ways, that what they might regard as a 
sufficient stock of  experience and basis for inference are no such things. 
'One swallow does not make a summer',  or 'Don't  count your chickens 
before  they're  hatched',  is  something the  experienced  Chief  Financial 
Officer might tell a young biotech researcher convinced that new experi- 
mental results  warrant  an immediate Initial  Public  Offering,  or,  that a 
father might tell a son celebrating early sporting success, or (as 'One robin 
doesn't make it Spring') that a sceptical California farmer recently told an 
agricultural scientist conducting field trials of a new variety of celery.62  And 
a mother might say to her adolescent daughter moping over a failed first 
romance that 'There are many more fish in the sea'. You think, the mother 
means, that you'll never be in love again, but you will, probably many times 
over; no, I can't guarantee it, but that's the way these things tend to work 
out - usually or for the most part. The proverbial voice here notes that the 
patterning -and the distorting -influence of a single striking instance may 
be  strong,  and it advises prudent  actors  to recognize  its  effects: 'Once 
bitten, twice shy'; 'The burnt child dreads the fire'.63 
In such ways, na'ive persons are told both about what the world is like 
and about sources of knowledge about the world: the what is contained 
within  the proverb;  the persons speaking it  in a  setting help  secure its 
meaning while,  at the same time,  they constitute themselves  as reliable 748  Social Studies of  Science 3115 
sources of  knowledge  about  the underlying  structure  or pattern  of  the 
world  and as  receptacles  of  collective wisdom.  Na'ive  and unreflective 
persons are told that they are naive and unreflective,  that their stock of 
experience  is  in  fact  restricted,  and  that  there  are  human  sources  of 
knowledge available who embody vast stores of experience and prudence. 
Proverbs of this sort, when suitably uttered, thus act as vehicles for the 
transmission of  accumulated experience from the old to the young,  and, 
more  generally,  from  the  experienced  to the inexperienced  in  any  en- 
deavour. They uphold  the moral  order  as  they  testify  to the  order  of 
nature.64 
Despite the torrents of learned commentary deploring vulgar percep- 
tion  and judgement  for their  entrapment in superficial  appearance,  yet 
another large  body  of proverbs  warns against  mistaking  appearance for 
reality: 'All  that glitters is not gold'; 'All  are not friends that speak us fair'; 
'You  can't  tell a book by its cover'  or 'wine by the barrel';  'Just  because 
there's  snow on the roof doesn't  mean there isn't  fire in the oven';  and, 
more generally and theoretically,  'Appearances  are deceptive'.  Don't  be 
taken in by flash superficiality. Things are rarely what their surface appear- 
ances suggest: 'Truth lies at the bottom of a well' and 'The best fish swim 
near the bottom'. What is  merely  superficial - however fashionably  and 
fiercely  valued  - is  likely  at  the  end  of  the  day  to  prove  empty  or 
meretricious.  Go for the solid and enduring stuff; don't  follow the con- 
federacy of dunces. Neither truth nor any social or material goods worth 
having are easy of attainment. Anyone who thinks so is a fool; anyone who 
tells you so is a fraud. Again, it takes accumulated experience to know this. 
Listen to the voice of that experience and learn. You will then be warned of 
life's recurrent pitfalls, and freed from the painful necessity of making your 
own mistakes: 'Experience keeps a dear school, but fools will learn in no 
other'. 
There are, however, proverbial aids to right inference from particular 
to pattern, and accumulated experience is available to identify these aids 
and to counsel how they should be recognized,  applied and acted upon. 
Many proverbs  direct notice to means by which one can reliably discern 
real states of affairs from visible signs: 'There's  no smoke without fire'; 
'Nearest  the heart,  nearest  the mouth'  (a  folk version  of  the 'Freudian 
slip');  and 'The  eye is  the index of the soul'.  Still other proverbs  speak 
about the sorts of alterations that are not to be expected, given the nature 
of things, about how natural and human things tend to work out, usually or 
for the most part. Take,  for instance,  'The leopard does not change his 
spots',  and the series of proverbial commentaries on heredity and develop- 
ment which includes 'What's  bred in the bone will not out of the flesh'; 
'Like fatherlmother,  like soddaughter';  'The apple falls not far from the 
tree';  'The child is father of the man';  'Such is the tree, such is the fruit'; 
and 'Blood will  Here the message is that things in general tend to go 
on in the future as they have in the past. Given the nature of things, there 
are  limits  to  the  changes  of  which  people  and  natural  processes  are 
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'NO tree grows to the sky', and 'Whatever  goes up must come down'. 
Singular violent occurrences and extremes meet natural tendencies in the 
opposite direction. Things - natural and human - tend to even out over 
time. One extreme is counter-balanced  by another. Whatever 'this'  is, this 
too will pass: 'All that is sharp is short'. Learn to recognize the violent, the 
singular and the extreme for what they are. It is not reasonable to expect 
that such instances, however remarkable and however much they may grip 
the imagination and the emotions, offer reliable signs of what is normal, 
and it is not prudent to plan judgement or action that is predicated on their 
long continuance or even recurrence:  'Lightning  never  strikes the same 
place twice'.  In this way,  some proverbs teach at once what is singular or 
extreme, as opposed to what is normal, and, again, they do so on the basis 
of accumulated experience, condensed in proverbs and brought to bear on 
a particular scene by those entitled to speak in the name of such experi- 
ence: 'Every dog has his day';  'After a storm comes a calm'; 'The tide will 
fetch  away what  the ebb brings';  'Pride  goes before  a fall';  'What  goes 
around comes around'. 
Just when you think that things are really set fair, they will turn lousy. 
Or when you  think  that things will  never  improve,  they will get better: 
'Every  cloud has a silver lining';  'It's  an ill wind  that blows nobody any 
good'.  Or,  again, when you think the ways things are will never change, 
they do: 'It's  a long lane that has no turning';  'Sometimes  all honey and 
then all turd'.  It's  not reasonable  to persuade yourself that good comes 
without bad,  or that either good or bad  can long continue. In general, 
there's  little purity in the world; things come all jumbled  up: 'Every path 
has a puddle';  'There's  no mirth without mourning';  'No pleasure without 
pain';  'No weal without woe'. Murphy's (or Sod's) Law ('If an aircraft part 
can be installed incorrectly, someone will install it that way') -made up by 
the Northrop aeronautic engineer Captain Edward A. Murphy in 1949 -
has age-old  proverbial  predecessors: 'Nothing  is certain but the unfore- 
seen'; 'The unexpected always happens';  'The bread never falls but on its 
buttered side'.66 
4. Proverbial Relativism 
Proverbial voices warn that it is imprudent to take at face value claims to 
universal, timeless or absolutely certain knowledge.  (The vulgar too have 
their postmodern moments.) Beware of anyone who tells you that there is a 
global formula for right judgement or a royal road to right action. Watch 
out for anyone who  claims that generalizations about the real world  can 
hold universally and without exception. Life is too complicated, too rich, 
and too heterogeneous to support any such assertion. Human intelligence 
can't compass the jumble of creation or the idiosyncrasy of people, and it's 
a mark of learned fools that they think their wit is up to the task, that a 
precise  'theory  of  everything'  is  at hand or just  around the corner. For 
every  sucker  born  every  minute  there's  a  simplifying  rationalizer  or a 
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intellectual  claims,  as  in  material  goods,  proverbial  voices  say  'Caveat 
emptor': 'Comparisons are odious';  'Circumstances  alter cases';  'Every like 
is not the same'; and neat abstractions tend not to hold good when one is 
concerned with  the contingencies and complexities  of real-world  judge- 
ment and action. Always  best  to be  cautious  in one's  judgements,  and 
circumspect  in  the  scope  of  one's  conclusions:  'Almost  was  never 
hanged'.67 
As in the natural,  so in the moral: there is no one right way to judge 
and to act that holds good in all places, times and circumstances. Solomon 
taught that 'To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose 
under the heaven'.68 The voice of the people concurs: 'Many men, many 
minds';  'Other times, other manners';  'When in Rome do as the Romans'; 
'Being on sea, sail; being on land, settle';  'Horses for courses'. There's no 
accounting for,  or disputing,  tastes: 'One  man's  meat is  another man's 
poison';  'Chacun a son goQt'; 'Every shoe fits not every foot'. 'Live and let 
live'  because  'It  takes  all  kinds  to  make  a  world'.  People  and  their 
predicaments  differ,  and  so  their  customs,  values  and standards  differ 
accordingly. There's  no exact  science of  such things,  except  in the ex- 
cremental purity  of  the uselessly abstract. And there should be nothing 
either  surprising  or troubling  about  injunctions  to moral  or  epistemic 
decorum: 'Measure  not another by  your  own  foot',  or,  as  Sly and the 
Family Stone put it, 'Different strokes for different folks'. 
So relativism has deep roots  in common sense. Many proverbs  ac-
knowledge  interpretative  flexibility and  express  suspicion  of  claims  to 
semantic fixity or the sufficiency of  propositions  to firmly fix  meaning: 
'Everything is as it is taken'; 'It is not the matter but the mind'. At the same 
time,  such voices do not proceed  from the flexibility of meaning to the 
commendation  of  postmodern  playfulness.  Judgement  does  vary  from 
situation to situation,  but local  standards may be,  and legitimately  are, 
obligatory. When in Rome you must do as the Romans, even though you 
are well  aware  that things  are legitimately  done otherwise  in Florence. 
There is nothing 'mere'  or 'arbitrary'  about such proverbs'  view of local 
custom. Just as folk wisdom testifies both to the variability and the force of 
local obligations, so it voices scepticism about either the availability or the 
necessity  of  transcendental justification.  Justification  both  comes to an 
end, and is bottomed,  in local obligation. Household gods are all the gods 
going, and they are quite powerful enough.69 
There is  no reason  to push  too  far  the  claim  that folk  wisdom  is 
globally relativistic in any very precise academic sense. There are, in fact, 
other proverbial voices pointing out, or urging, commonality of standards 
and finding unity  in apparent  diversity. 'What  is  sauce for the goose is 
sauce for the gander'  can be  used  to argue that  different  categories  of 
people ought to be judged not by different but by the same standards. That 
'There is one law for the rich and another for the poor' counts both as a 
cynical statement about how things are and as an implicit recommendation 
that they ought to be otherwise. And, in the case of truth and authority, 
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and 'If the doctor cures, the sun sees it; but if he kills, the earth hides it'. 
(Proverbial voices have never spoken well of doctors and lawyers,  or, for 
that  matter,  millers.)  There  are  also  proverbs  that  direct  attention  to 
genuine and pertinent sameness against uninstructed or biased tendencies 
to see differences and particularities: 'In every country dogs bite'  or 'the 
sun rises in the morning'; 'All the world is one country'. Even a king 'has to 
put on his trousers one leg at a time',  the same king that 'even a cat may 
look at',  and robust subjectivity may turn out to offer a more secure basis 
for  consensus  than  learned  pretences  to  objectivity:  'Hearts  may  agree 
though heads differ'. 
The most pervasive sentiment informing such pieces of folk wisdom is 
not, of course, some formal relativist position; it is, rather, an emotionally- 
charged  sceptical,  even  iconoclastic,  deflation  of  intellectual  pretension 
and moral  absolutism. The learned  person  is  likely  to prove  a  fool  in 
ordinary life - and it's  ordinary life  that  really  does matter. The pious 
preacher  is quite possibly a hypocrite when it comes to everyday moral 
action. Those who pretend to speak for God, Truth and Reality usually 
turn out to be  speaking for their  own special  interests.  Grand rational 
plans, systems and abstractions rarely hold good when they are actually put 
to the test in the real world: 'It's  easier said than done';  'Talking pays no 
tolls';  'Fine words butter no parsnips'.  But putting fine words and rational 
plans to the test of everyday life is the appropriate assay: 'The proof of the 
pudding is in the eating'. So intellectuals come off no better than lawyers: 
'A handful of nature is better than an armful of science'; 'A mere scholar, a 
mere ass';  'Much  science,  much sorrow'.  Nor do priests and the pious: 
'The nearer the church, the farther from God'; 'All are not saints that go to 
church'.  If your  concern  is  with  practical  judgements  in real  life,  then 
common sense is a surer guide than book-learning:  'Years know more than 
books'.70 AS Clifford Geertz maintained about 'common-sense'  sentiments 
in general, 'Sobriety, not subtlety, realism, not imagination, are the keys to 
wi~dom'.~' 
5. Are Proverbs Logically Incoherent? 
If you treat proverbs as naked propositions -if you do not bring to bear on 
their interpretation the culture and contingencies of a setting of use - then 
they  suffer  from  some quite obvious  epistemic flaws. The truth of  the 
proverbial proposition 'A fish rots from the head' seems doubly vulnerable: 
it is susceptible to counter-evidence that might be contained either in your 
refrigerator or in a university  faculty whose malaise  is  not obviously the 
dean's  fault. Moreover,  there are evidently quite a lot of proverbs - one 
thinks of weather proverbs  about Bredon Hill putting on his  cap,  about 
Groundhog Day, green Christmases and white Easters -that are trite, that 
don't  stand up to the findings of  modern science,  or that continue  to 
circulate in settings where they have little or no predictive value: it's  just 
what you say to have something to say about the weather (though that has 
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want to acknowledge in proverbial economies, and even for all of proverbs' 
robustness, the body of proverbs is not philosophy, or, to be more precise, 
not philosophy as it is ideally represented. Proverbial propositions need a 
lot  of  situational  help  in  order  to  be pertinent  and true. If  proverbial 
propositions are to be accounted true, then a whole raft of qualifications, 
reservations,  and stipulations about context and contingency,  have to be 
noted or taken for granted as part of their assessment and application. But 
once they are granted that help - that is, once they are seen as part of a 
working proverbial economy -then they are powerful stuff. 
Yet  scholars have historically been reluctant to concede proverbs that 
situational help. Scarcely had the dust settled on the earliest learned efforts 
systematically to collect such folkish sayings when it was recognized,  and 
loudly  trumpeted,  that  valued  proverbs  could  be  found  that  formally 
contradicted other valued proverbs. In Tudor and Stuart England, human- 
ists liked  to play with the genre known  as  crossed proverbs - assembling 
proverbs that self-evidently clashed with each other - to make sport, and 
sometimes also to make a point about the inadequacy and the methodical 
indiscipline  of  the common people's  way  of  thinking.73 More recently, 
some  social  psychology  textbooks  demonstrate  the  inadequacy  of  lay 
reasoning by drawing students'  attention to the phenomenon of  contra- 
dictory proverbs: 
A standard ploy is the presentation of a set of maxims, proverbs or bits of 
folk wisdom as 'common-sense theories' of social psychology. Then, when 
certain pairs of maxims are shown to conflict (e.g. 'Birds of a feather flock 
together'  as  against  'Opposites  attract'),  and the utter  senselessness of 
common-sense psychology has thereby been demonstrated, the writer is 
free to appraise students of the virtues of the scientific approach to these 
matters.. . . [Elveryrnan [is given a] perpetual role as a straw man.74 
For every apparently sage 'Look before you leap', there is an equally valued 
and opposite 'He who hesitates is lost';  'Absence  makes the heart grow 
fonder',  but 'Out of sight, out of mind'.  How could rational persons find 
the slightest value in any such generalizing propositions when the body of 
them  was  so evidently  vulnerable  to  contradiction?  How  could  vulgar 
knowledge  be  anything  but  worthless  when  such  contradictions  were 
tolerated,  amazingly  even  going  unnoticed  until  the  learned  collected 
them,  arrayed  them  in  lists,  reflected  on them,  and pointed  out  their 
contradictory nature? Elementary logic soundly teaches us that a proposi- 
tion cannot be true if its opposite is also true: 'Socrates is mortal'  is true 
just  on the condition that 'Socrates is immortal' is untrue. And so, to the 
extent that proverbs massively contradict each other, the body of proverbs 
is incoherent and its members individually unreliable. 
Here, again, the learned criticism mistakes its object. In his study of 
the relationship between cultural change and the development of literacy, 
the anthropologist Jack Goody noted  an interesting feature of scholarly 
engagement with proverbs. The first thing the learned did was to make lists 
of  them.  By  that  simple  act,  Goody  observed,  the  learned  not  only 
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but also shifted its identity and altered its epistemic value. By  taking the 
proverb out of its oral, situated and purposive setting, 
by listing it along with a lot of other similar pithy sentences, one changes 
the character of the oral form. For example, it then becomes possible to 
set one proverb  against  another in order to see if  the meaning of  one 
contradicts the meaning of  another; they are now tested for a universal 
truth value,  whereas  their  applicability had been  essentially contextual 
(though phrased in a universal manner).75 
The proverb that is thus contradicted by another proverb is a qualitatively 
different thing from the proposition or prescription uttered in context of 
practical use. 
Given that proverbs are strategies for dealing with situations, they may 
properly be said to contradict only when both the particular situations they 
typify and the particular attitudes they express about that situation are the 
same.  But just  as  proverbs-in-an-economy  name  (and  help  create)  re-
current situations  and point out pertinent  similarities between them,  so 
concrete situations lumped together  for one purpose  may  differ in any 
number of respects, and the respects in which they differ may be pertinent 
for other purposes. 'Many hands make light work' contradicts 'Too many 
cooks spoil the broth' just on the condition that, say, all kitchen work is the 
same with respect to the value of your helping me. But why ever should 
that be? If I am washing the dishes, if I am fed up with the work, and if my 
kitchen happens to be big enough, then 'Many hands make light work' is 
what I might say to sum up a situation, to link it in your mind with other 
warrantably similar situations, and to summon your assistance. However, if 
I  am whisking  up  egg-whites  for  my  famous flourless  walnut  cake,  no 
matter  how  hard the work  is,  and no matter  how  large  the kitchen,  I 
decline  any help  you  might  offer by  saying 'Too  many  cooks  spoil  the 
broth': this is a one-person job, like others to which (you know) that saying 
has been applied. The contradiction that seems so evident when proverbs 
are treated as isolated propositions-in-a-list  vanishes like smoke when they 
are interpreted as utterances-in-a-particular-situation. 
6. Proverbial Common Sense and Science Revisited 
I began by sketching a pervasive evaluative contrast made by the learned 
between  proverbs  (as tokens  of vulgar  knowledge)  and properly  expert 
forms (the propositions of science and philosophy). The vices of proverbial 
common  sense  consisted  largely  in  its  unreflectiveness,  its  referential 
imprecision and its incoherence; the virtues of learned knowledge included 
its refusal to remain trapped in the world of appearance, its clarity, and its 
logical tidiness.  Accordingly,  I  end by  reviewing some of  the epistemic 
virtues of proverbial economies, and then by reconfiguring aspects of the 
traditional  contrast  between  our  most  highly  valued  forms  of  expert 
knowledge and the world of proverbial common sense. 
Supposing one wanted to say that proverbs are epistemically powerful 
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First,  proverbs'  linguistic  structures flag that something  special is being 
said - for example, summing up a situation or giving an overall judgement 
about what is to be done - and these same structures facilitate recall and 
undeformed circulation - what I have referred to as proverbs'  mnemonic 
robustness. Anything that is so readily retrieved, that travels while remain- 
ing relatively unchanged  in  form,  and that  is  put  to  such  a  range  of 
practical uses might be thought rather potent. Defining knowledge as that 
which is archived may point in the direction of one sort of epistemic virtue; 
defining  knowledge  as  that  which  can  be  easily  accessed  and put  to 
productive  use  here  and  now  points  towards  another  kind  of  virtue. 
Second, while proverbs cannot avail themselves (as aphorisms and quota- 
tions  can)  of the authority that may  be  attached to the prestigious in- 
dividual  originator, they are compensated by speaking with  the voice of 
tradition,  the ancestors and anonymous collective wisdom. No individual 
or  sectional  interest  attaches  to their  claims;  no special  circumstances 
attending their origins limit their applicability. Third, proverbs-in-use  can 
have a self-referential quality. They tell you what sort of situation you are 
in, thus orientating you towards appropriate action and, in so doing, they 
help to create the social realities they describe. Fourth, proverbs-in-use  are 
generalizations about experience and action that are semantically protean 
and highly adaptable to different situations. They can speak about cocky 
chickens and cheeky children at the same time, and their potential range of 
reference  is not subject to knowable limits. Their form stays stable,  and 
their truth may be conceded, while both their meaning and their reference 
change.  Fifth,  as  cherished  generalizations,  proverbs-in-use  are  highly 
protected from refutation by empirically available counter-instances. Com- 
petent  members  of  the  culture understand  that  proverbial  generalizing 
speech about chickens is not to be negated by awkward facts available from 
the expert knowledge of poultry science, nor are such competently used 
metaphorical proverbs subjectable to queries about the appropriateness of 
chicken behaviour to the human case at hand. Thomas Kuhn has shown us 
how  deeply  entrenched in expert communal life are the paradigms  of  a 
scientific practice,  but I suggest that it is  far easier for members of  the 
appropriate sub-culture to negate or modify the formal generalizations of 
either poultry science or particle physics than it is to dispute the truth or 
pertinence  of  a  competently  uttered  proverb  in  its  naturally  occurring 
economy. For these and other reasons, it is hard to challenge the epistemic 
power of proverbs in those natural economies. What you can dispute, and 
what  has  indeed  been  repeatedly  disputed,  is  the  epistemic  value  of 
proverbs compared to the propositions of such learned practices as philos- 
ophy, natural science, medicine and engineering. How might such criti- 
cisms be answered? 
Part of the answer has already been given: apples should be compared 
with  other  apples,  oranges  with  other  oranges,  but  an  equitable  and 
informed comparison is  rarely on offer when the learned compare their 
knowledge and practice with  that of the common people.  Contrast pro- 
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science and they tend to come out badly. But even here learned general- 
izations  about proverbs  are often flawed by  selective  inattention  to the 
variety of  sentiments expressed in proverbial propositions.  I have shown 
that it is  no hard work  to assemble a mass of  proverbs  commending a 
reflective and sceptical attitude to superficial appearances or to the claims 
of  established  authority and,  hence,  that it would be  an easy matter  to 
reconstruct the sentiments, norms and gross methods of science from the 
propositions of proverbial common sense. Proverbial propositions are very 
various.  If  we  mean by  common sense the  sentiments expressed in its 
proverbial propositions,  then  there  is  no  one  direction  in which they col- 
lectively  point;  if,  however,  we  mean  by  common  sense  the  cognitive 
capacities employed in an array of everyday reasonings, there is no con- 
vincing reason yet offered to distinguish these capacities from those em- 
ployed  in  a  range  of  learned  activities. More  importantly,  in  learned 
evaluative contrasts, proverbs are typically denied the help of their natural 
scenes  of  use,  and  the  epistemic  virtues  of  a  proverbial  economy  are 
transformed into the vices of proverbial-propositions-in-a-list. 
The unevenness of the comparative playing-field is more evident than 
that, for a parodic account of proverbs is typically contrasted not to the real 
worlds of scientific and philosophical practice but to cosmetically worked- 
up idealizations of  science and philosophy.  However,  if  we  take a closer 
look at a range of modern expert practices, we can begin to notice the r81e 
of linguistic forms strikingly like those the folklorists have documented in 
everyday life. Present-day  learned practices also have their proverbs and 
other mnemonically robust short genres; proverbial economies are present 
there  too.  For  example,  canonical  scientific  laws  and  meta-principles 
frequently avail themselves of the mnemonic robustness  of the proverbial 
form:  'Ontogeny  recapitulates  phylogeny';  'For  every action  there is  an 
equal and opposite reaction'; 'Opposites attract';  'All life/cells/organization 
from pre-existing life/cells/organization'; 'Nature  abhors a vacuum';  'Na- 
ture  doesn't  make  leaps';  'Remove the cause and the effect will  cease'. 
More significantly, proverbial  (and similar) forms often  express modern 
technical practices' valued rules of thumb. They identify recurrent predica- 
ments,  point  out pitfalls,  and  instruct practitioners how  to proceed  in 
different types of situation. Such proverbs only occasionally find their way 
into textbooks and formal presentations of their practices' knowledge-base, 
but practitioners would arguably be lost without them. They would find it 
much more difficult to transmit their cultural heritage from one generation 
to  the  next,  or,  should  they  wish  to  do  so,  to  make  their  principles 
accessible to cultural neighbours. The case for inarticulable  tacit knowl- 
edge in  science, medicine  and  engineering  is  now well  established  as  a 
matter of principle. But no legitimate appreciation of the tacit dimension 
in  science  should  dispute  the  value  of  mnemonically  robust  linguistic 
genres -what I call 'technical proverbs' -in transmitting expert lore within 
relevant cultures or even across some cultural boundaries. Of course, the 
understanding of such technical proverbs is dependent upon a prior shared 
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Whether or not it is available in specific cases is a matter for empirical 
inquiry, not for methodological fiat.76 
Some  of  these  technical  proverbs  are  by  tradition  established  or 
imported from common usage;  others are evidently recent special crea- 
tions.  In biochemistry,  for  example,  it  is  a  maxim  not to 'waste  clean 
thinking on dirty enzymes'; in population biology, and many allied fields, 
they  say  'Statistics  is  a  way  of  making  bad  data  look  good';  an  im-
munologist, discussing the merits of rival hypotheses, reminded readers of 
the legal and forensic maxim that 'Absence of evidence is not evidence of 
absence'.  Delamont  and Atkinson's  recent  study of doctoral  training in 
science quotes the wisdom a biochemistry supervisor aims to transmit to 
his students: 'Where. . . an experiment is not working my attitude is "don't 
flog  a  dead  horse"',  and  David  Noble  documents  the  'First  Law  of 
Machining' - 'Don't  mess with success'.  In English law,  judges  are pru- 
dently counselled 'When in doubt do nowt'.  Stock-market speculators are 
warned that 'Many a good mine has been spoiled by sinking a shaft'; that 
'No tree grows to the sky'; and that they should 'Buy on the rumour, sell 
on the fact'. But in a bull market investors are assured that 'A rising tide 
floats all boats'.  Designers of search engines say 'Big guns rarely hit small 
targets',  and start-up  companies having  a poor  sense of  their  potential 
market are sometimes reminded by their advisors that 'If your only tool is a 
hammer,  everything looks  like  a  nail'.  Venture  capitalists  are  told  that 
'There's  no premium for complexity'; that they should 'Bet on the jockey, 
not on the horse';  and that 'It takes money to make money'.  Optimists 
among them say 'Go big or go home', while post-dotcom-crash realists say 
'More  companies  die of indigestion than starvation'.  Entrepreneurs  are 
warned  against  the strategy  of  'selling  vitamins  (optional  goods)  rather 
than aspirins (necessities)'. Human resource managers sclm up their craft's 
wisdom  about remunerating talented technical staff by reminding CEOs 
that 'If  you pay  peanuts, you  get monkeys'.  A Florida  state  emergency 
planner stated as an expert adage in his business that one should 'Run from 
the water, and hide from the wind'. An ecologist summing up his position 
about Colorado River usage  judged  that 'The fish doesn't  drink up the 
pond in which it lives'. A baseball pitching coach encapsulated his expert 
advice by saying 'Challenge early, nibble late',  and a Royal Navy officer in 
the Falklands war referred to a maxim quoted by his public school boxing 
coach: 'If  they  fight,  box  them;  if  they box,  fight them'.  In intellectual 
property law they say that 'Tradition is permission'. A linguist commenting 
on the 'Ebonics'  controversy said that 'A language is merely a dialect with 
an army'. And a now-influential dictum in macro-sociology has it that 'War 
made the state, and the state made war'.77 
From Antiquity to the present, medicine has relied heavily on maxims 
and aphorisms that economically and memorably transmit expert knowl- 
edge of probable causes, valuable therapies, and the nature of life in the 
medical profession.  Some of  the Hippocratic aphorisms have  proverbial 
form - 'Life is  short, art is long';  'Desperate cases need desperate reme- 
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are  metrically  catchy:  in  dermatology,  there  is  only  some  whimsy  in 
instructing novices 'If it is dry, make it wet,/If it is wet, make it dry,/If it is 
red, make it blue,/If it is blue, make it red,/If all this fails, soak it in warm 
Pablurn'.  Still others have only brevity, and a certain local vividness, to 
assist their retention in physicians'  unusually well-trained organs of mem- 
ory. The great clinician Sir William Osler offered some aphorisms that have 
proverbial warrant - 'The glutton digs his own grave with his teeth' - and 
many others that are just  brief,  and well-turned,  enough to strike home: 
'Feel the pulse with two hands and ten fingers'; 'Depend upon palpation, 
not percussion, for knowledge of the spleen';  'If many drugs are used for a 
disease, all are insufficient'; 'Pneumonia is the captain of the men of death 
and tuberculosis is  the handmaid'.78 Collections of  anonymous  medical 
maxims - terse, but rather less catchy - continue to circulate,  especially 
among students always on the lookout for cribs and abridgements to assist 
the  medical  memory  under  strain:  'Headache  due  to  hypertension  is 
generally occipital';  'It is uncommon for vascular disease to be limited to 
one area'.79 Some modern commentary on the degree of certainty legit- 
imately  to be  expected  in  medical  practice  celebrates  the probabilistic 
character,  and proper understanding,  of  medical maxims: 'Maxims  that 
begin with probability, rather than with certainty, are more faithful to the 
wisdom of the experienced clini~ian'.~~ 
Computer programming famously contributes to the general culture 
'Garbage in, garbage out' and 'What you see is what you get'. And an early 
guide to writing BASIC, FORTRAN and COBOL was entitled Program- 
ming Proverbs, the cover designed to look like an old American almanac. It 
was  organized as a series  of  26 glossed maxims for programmers,  each 
'proverb' identifying possible pitfalls or suggesting proven ways of working 
round them, for instance, 'Never assume the computer assumes anything'. 
'As with most maxims or proverbs',  the author sagely noted, 
the rules are not absolute, but neither are they arbitrary. Behind each one 
lies a generous nip of thought and experience. . . . Just take a look at past 
errors  and  then  reconsider the proverbs.  Before  going on,  a prefatory 
proverb  seems appropriate: 'Do Not  Break the  Rules  before  Learning 
Them'. . . . Experience  keeps  a dear  school, but fools will  learn in no 
other.81 
We are now in the world of heuristics. The term derives from the Greek, 
designating the art of discovering,  and, as it came into modern English 
usage, it tended to pick out the cognitive processes and linguistic resources 
used  to solve problems  and to render judgements  when information is 
incomplete and when the tools of formal logic and probability theory are 
either inappropriate or practically unavailable. In the mid-1940s the Hun- 
garian-American mathematician George Polya surveyed the heuristics of 
mathematical problem-solving in his classic How to Solve It. These heuristic 
principles, Polya wrote,  'are general, but, except for their generality, they 
are natural,  simple,  obvious,  and proceed  from plain  common sense.. . 
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noted, heuristics take proverbial form, and he concluded his book with a 
section entitled 'The Wisdom of Proverbs'.  Folkish proverbs, he observed, 
often capture crucial aspects of mathematical problem-solving,  identifying 
recurrent  pitfalls  and prescribing  constructive  action.  Indeed,  they  are 
used  in  mathematical  culture  to  transmit  lore  and  warn  of  dangers. 
Heuristic proverbs  are not perfect:  'There  are many shrewd  and some 
subtle remarks in proverbs but, obviously, there is no scientific system free 
of inconsistencies and obscurities in them'. And so Polya joined the legions 
of scholars pointing out their contradictory advices: 
On the contrary, many a proverb can be matched with another proverb 
giving  exactly opposite  advice,  and  there  is  a  great  latitude  of  inter- 
pretation. It would be foolish to regard proverbs as an authoritative source 
of universally applicable wisdom but it would be a pity to disregard the 
graphic description of heuristic procedures provided by proverbs. 
'It could be an interesting task', Polya said, 'to collect, and group proverbs 
about planning,  seeking means,  and choosing between lines of action,  in 
short, proverbs about solving problems'.  In fact, the proverbs Polya listed 
in this connection were all of  folkish origins,  but, when suitably glossed 
and  brought  to  bear  on their  new  mathematical  scenes  of  use,  their 
previous  employment  among  the  common people  made  them  no less 
valuable: 'Diligence is the mother of all good luck'; 'Perseverance  kills the 
game';  'An oak is not felled at one stroke';  'Try all the keys in the bunch'; 
'Arrows are made of all sorts of wood'.s2 
By the early 1970s, the most influential work on heuristics was being 
done by the cognitive psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, 
focusing not on mathematical  or  scientific  problem-solving  but  on the 
heuristics  of  everyday judging  and decision-making.  While Tversky  and 
Kahneman formally acknowledged that the employment of such common 
heuristics in everyday life was 'highly economical and usually effective', the 
overall thrust of their research was to show how often and how seriously 
their use led to 'severe and systematic errors'. Everyday heuristics, such as 
those encapsulated in 'the Gambler's Fallacy', were identified as sources of 
'bias'.  Better outcomes would be secured if further information about the 
situation was sought, or if  the tools of logic and probability theory were 
systematically  employed,  as  they  would  be  by  trained  experts.83 Some 
readers  of this work drew the lesson that it was  best not to involve the 
common  people  in  consequential  political  and  technological  decision- 
making activities, as their cognitive processes systematically led them into 
error.84  The heuristics of everyday life were poor cousins to the methods 
used by modern experts and, while Tversky  and Kahneman only some- 
times supplied the linguistic forms commending these principles of judge- 
ment, proverbial versions for many such heuristics and, indeed, for their 
logical opposites, are easily located. 
It was  not until  fairly recently  that dissenting voices emerged  from 
within  cognitive psychology. Gerd Gigerenzer and his  colleagues  in the 
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decision-making -lay or learned -ever takes place in scenes where time is 
very  abundant, where total pertinent  knowledge  is possible,  and where 
computational capacity is unlimited.85  That is to say, all human judgement 
that is  actually judgement  about real-world  predicaments is  judgement 
under uncertainty. The learned are in the same boat  as  the vulgar. As 
Gigerenzer and his colleagues write, the greatest weakness of the model of 
unbounded  rationality 'is  that it  does not describe the way  real  people 
think'. Not even how philosophers think: 
One philosopher  was struggling to decide whether to stay at Columbia 
University  or  to accept  a  job  offer  from  a  rival  university. The other 
advised him: 'Just maximize your expected utility -you always write about 
doing this'. Exasperated, the first philosopher responded: 'Come on, this 
is serious'. 
Acting  on  the  Gambler's  Fallacy - the  belief  that,  for  example,  the 
probability of heads on the ninth toss of the coin is greater than 50% after 
eight tails in a row - will,  indeed, lose you money, just  on the condition 
that the game is  an ideal, unbiased  one, but in real-life  gambling one is 
often faced with the decision about 'what kind of game this is',  crooked or 
straight, and, if crooked, in what way, what to do about it, and what one's 
opponents will do in light of what one does. Moreover,  what Gigerenzer 
and his colleagues call 'fast and frugal' heuristics are not only surprisingly 
adequate  to tasks  at  hand,  they  can  also  be  demonstrably  superior to 
problem-solving  techniques that attempt to secure further information, to 
survey  a wide  range  of  possible  outcomes,  and to compute  in a more 
thoroughgoing manner. The best, as the proverb has it, is truly the enemy 
of the good. Like Tversky and Kahneman, Gigerenzer's group do not seek 
to identify the linguistic embodiments of such 'fast  and frugal'  heuristics, 
but,  towards  the end of  their important book,  they  offer an intriguing 
comment on how  such heuristics  may  be  acquired: 'Simple  heuristics', 
they say,  'can be learned in a social manner, through imitation, word of 
mouth, or cultural heritage'. And they note that 'cultural strictures, histor- 
ical proverbs,  and the like' are effective ways of transmitting such powerful 
'fast and frugal social rea~oning'.~~ 
Where, then,  is a legitimate contrast between,  say,  science and com- 
mon sense? And is there a r61e  for such linguistic forms as proverbs  (and 
related short genres) in any such legitimate contrast? Nothing in this study 
argues that there can be no legitimate contrasts between various modes of 
cognition  and practice,  that all,  so  to speak,  is  on a  level,  and for  all 
purposes. Much, however, cautions against facile assumptions about the 
domains to be contrasted. What counts as common sense is probably pretty 
diverse in its attitudes and counsels. Geertz argued that 'there are really no 
acknowledged  specialists in common sense',  correctly gesturing at perva- 
sive  lay  suspicion  of  learned  expertise and its  pretension^.^^ Yet  such a 
claim seems to rest on an excessively homogeneous,  and too systematic, 
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specialized experts in 'common sense', but there are acknowledged special- 
ists in fishing, gardening and market trading. There are also quite common 
people who are conceded such expertise as there is in finding and holding 
a spouse, bringing up the kids and gauging the credibility of different sorts 
of folk. As individuals and as members of groups, some common people 
are conceded to be very experienced in such things; others less so. And just 
as proverbs'  counsels,  and proverbial scenes, are very various,  so there is 
little reason to presume the distinctive unity of learned practices or of the 
forms of reasoning employed in the different moments of any one learned 
practice. 
In  Galileo's  Dialogue  Concerning  the  Two  Chief  World  Systems,  the 
Aristotelian  Simplicio,  objecting  to  Salviati's  mathematical  physics, 
claimed that 'these mathematical subtleties do very well in the abstract, but 
they do not work  out when  applied to sensible  and physical matters'.88 
Bringing Simplicio up to date, and giving him his due, one is tempted to 
say  that  all  learned  practices,  when  they  are  dealing  with  real-world 
contingencies,  implicate judgement under uncertainty. So the Aristotelian 
might concede that proverbial economies may be attached to physics rather 
than  mathematics,  or,  in  a  more  contemporary  sensibility,  that  such 
economies are to be found in engineering, medicine, politics, business and 
cookery rather than in pure science,  mathematics,  philosophy  or logic. 
Conceding engineering (and its cousins) to the world of proverbial econ- 
omies is indeed an important step, but it is not enough. As we have learned 
more about the practice of science, so we have learned to appreciate the 
extent to which it is like how we  understand engineering to be, the extent 
to which the conduct of science is like a craft or an art. Like the proverbs of 
the common people, the heuristics of science belong to the domains of the 
more or less, the usually or for the most part, the ceteris paribus and the 
mutatis mutandis. Philosophers have rightly warned us not to seek a 'logic of 
discovery',  and in the processes  of  discovery the r61e  of proverbial heur- 
istics should be uncontentious. But the making and the justifying of ideal 
worlds are themselves a real-world business. Learned practices for judging 
and for justifying also involve judgement under uncertainty, and there too 
proverbial economies may be found. Only in the ideal worlds produced by 
the real worlds  of learned  practices is  there  judgement  under total cer- 
tainty,  and  only  there  might  one  expect  to  dispense  with  proverbial 
economies. But it is good to remind ourselves that no human practitioner 
has ever yet been to such an ideal world to confirm the expe~tation.'~ 
While learned opinion has historically tended to contrast the cognitive 
processes used by the learned and the vulgar, it is not impossible to find 
scientists  themselves arguing to the contrary. In the 1850s, T.H. Huxley 
wrote that 'Science  is, I believe, nothing but trained and organised common 
sense'.90  'The whole of science',  according to Albert Einstein, 'is  nothing 
more  than  a  refinement  of  every  day  thinking'.91 Max  Planck  agreed: 
'Scientific reasoning does not differ from ordinary reasoning in kind, but 
merely in degree of refinement  and accuracy.. .'.92  And  so did J. Robert 
Oppenheimer ('Science  is based  on common sense; it cannot contradict 761  Shapin: Proverbial Economies 
itY),  the  chemist  James  Conant  (science  is  'one  extension  of  common 
sense')  and the biologist  C.H. Waddington  ('Science  is,  after all, largely 
common  sense').93 If  proverbs  belong  to the worlds  of  common-sense 
practice, they and their short-generic cousins belong also to the worlds of 
science, and what we can understand about proverbial economies should 
be  available as  a resource  for anyone wanting  to understand  real-world 
scientific practice. 
So if we seriously want to make some cultural distinctions, this study 
of  proverbial  economies suggests  three  things:  first,  that  we  ditch the 
traditional straight-up contrast between proverbial common sense and the 
cognitive resources of learned expertise; second, that we look to differences 
in how,  as Huxley suggested,  knowledge  economies are organized,  how 
their  members  interact  with  each  other  and how  they  relate  to  their 
cultures'  stock  of  knowledge;  third,  that  the  objects of  comparison be 
individuated:  'science'  versus  'common  sense'  doesn't  work,  but  why 
shouldn't  we  be  interested in  the differences  and similarities  obtaining 
among, for example, accountancy and botanical taxonomy, fly-fishing and 
neurology, cooking and chemistry? 'The devil',  as the proverb has it, 'is in 
the details'.  But, as another proverb says, so is God. 
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